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I.  Introduction 
This paper reviews several measures that New Mexico should pursue to improve its 
management of water. The crisis in New Mexico’s water affects all of the citizens of the state, 
but hasty responses may promise more than they can deliver. In this paper we present several 
measures that will allow better use of the resources that the state has, and rectify imbalances in 
how water has been managed in the state. 
Many observers credit New Mexico with an excellent body of water law. This law can 
allocate our scarce water resources among competing uses so as to promote economic growth 
and environmental sustainability. With the establishment of protections for riparian areas and 
instream flows, the state can also protect its public trust in its rivers. New Mexico has enough 
water to promote economic growth, maintain agriculture, and protect the environment.  In order 
for our water law to be an effective part of the state’s institutional framework, water rights must 
be determined. The majority of surface water users in New Mexico do not have adjudicated 
water rights. Economic mechanisms have given the nation a powerful economy, in which goods 
are delivered to purchasers in a timely fashion. Without better defined ownership rights, our 
ability to transfer water is unduly hampered by high transaction costs. 
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 Our underlying premise is that water management in the state has made insufficient use 
of mechanisms that would signal users about the true value of water. The first impediment is that 
water is often free to the user, or provided at prices that are inconsequential for users. This is in 
large part due to the lack of adjudication of water rights. In fact, users may not even have 
information about how much water they are using.  A  water conservation charge should be 
levied on all surface and groundwater diversions. The revenues from this fee will be designated 
to purchase and lease water for environmental purposes, accelerate the adjudication process, and 
to assist with payment for water conservation measures. This water conservation charge will 
have the added benefit of reducing our consumption of water. 
Second,  state and local governments need to aggressively address water use through a 
combination of measures, including water pricing reform, water metering, controls on new wells, 
increasing the ability of sellers to transfer conserved water, and creating protection for the 
ecology of streams and rivers.  Many of the current uses of water have a low economic value, 
meaning that change should not injure current users because new users should compensate 
current users. In other western states, the state or other institutions often act to facilitate these 
transfers and to devise conditions to protect communities of origin. 
Finally, our current system of water administration does not acknowledge the public 
values (common goods) in New Mexico’s rivers and streams. Albuquerque’s Bosque, the trees 
and the river, provides a well known example of a resource that “belongs” to everyone in the 
area, in the sense that it is a natural resource that defines and enriches the community. 
Nonetheless, western water law makes it very difficult to protect these public values. This paper 
proposes that state and federal funding be devoted to defining and acquiring water rights for 
instream use and to protect natural resources and similar public areas. 
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We begin with a detailed overview of where New Mexico’s water is currently applied 
and the economic aspects of that use. This review indicates that the vast majority of water is used 
in agriculture, and that the state is dangerously dependent on groundwater pumping. 
  
II.  Profile of water use in New Mexico 
New Mexico has five primary rivers. To a large extent the Canadian, Gila, Pecos, Rio 
Grande, and San Juan rivers are the renewable sources of water in the state. This section reviews 
the physical withdrawals and consumptive use on the major rivers and the economic value of 
water for agriculture, municipal and environmental uses.  
 
Diversions and Consumptive Use 
A characteristic of water that is often misunderstood is the difference between diversion 
and withdrawal or consumptive use. A user will divert water out of stream and apply it to some 
use such as growing a crop. The crop actually evaporates less water than what is applied (the use 
of water by plants is called evapotranspiration – a combination of evaporation from wet surfaces 
and transpiration by the plant). Water that is evaporated or otherwise lost to the system is the 
amount of consumptive use (consumptive use is also called withdrawal or depletion). We will 
use consumptive use (CU) throughout the paper.  The unused water or return flow seeps down 
into the groundwater, and because shallow aquifers and rivers are usually connected 
(conjunctive), the return flow will eventually make it back to the river. The return water then 
becomes available for downstream diversion and use. Diversion, evaporation and return flow 
occur for almost all uses except instream flows. Municipal water has a return flow (usually about 
50%) through the sewer system.  For some uses, the diversion is not so obvious. Users often 
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pump groundwater as their source of water. To the extent that the aquifers are conjunctive to the 
river,1  the surface system will replenish the deficit created in aquifers and surface flows will be 
reduced. 
The distinction between diversion, evaporation and return flow is significant in that all 
affect the river in different ways.  Diversion has an immediate effect of reducing surface flows 
but the extracted volume is partially replaced by return flow. It is often common to have more 
total diversions than native water in the river. Return flows are usually of higher salinity than the 
river so as water is diverted and returned repeatedly, salinity in the river increases. Evaporation 
is a withdrawal of water from the river. 
 
The following five sets of tables indicate by sector (a) surface and groundwater 
diversions, (b) return flow, and (c) consumptive use in major river basins of New Mexico. 
                                                 
1 The relationship between surface and groundwater is often extremely complex. Some groundwater withdrawals are 
never replaced by the river and are ”mined”. Other river-aquifer connections involve considerable time lags between 
when the water is pumped and when the pumping affects surface flows. 
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Diversion Percent Diversion Percent Diversion Percent
Public 17,716 4.2% 668 14.4% 18,384 4.3%
Domestic 0 0.0% 2,657 57.3% 2,657 0.6%
Agriculture 315,665 74.0% 0 0.0% 315,665 73.2%
Livestock 172 0.0% 548 11.8% 720 0.2%
Commercial 147 0.0% 64 1.4% 211 0.0%
Industrial 2,230 0.5% 45 1.0% 2,275 0.5%
Mining 83 0.0% 652 14.1% 735 0.2%
Power 51,908 12.2% 0 0.0% 51,908 12.0%
Evaporation 38,797 9.1% 0 0.0% 38,797 9.0%
426,718 4,634 431,352
Return Percent Return Percent Return Percent
Public 8,361 6.3% 174 10.4% 8,535 6.3%
Domestic 0 0.0% 1,461 87.1% 1,461 1.1%
Agriculture 116,398 87.1% 0 0.0% 116,398 86.0%
Livestock 0 0.0% 2 0.1% 2 0.0%
Commercial 20 0.0% 33 2.0% 53 0.0%
Industrial 10 0.0% 8 0.5% 18 0.0%
Mining 29 0.0% 0 0.0% 29 0.0%
Power 8,842 6.6% 0 0.0% 8,842 6.5%
Evaporation 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
133,660 1,678 135,338
Use Percent Use Percent Use Percent
Public 9,355 3.2% 494 16.7% 9,849 3.3%
Domestic 0 0.0% 1,196 40.5% 1,196 0.4%
Agriculture 199,267 68.0% 0 0.0% 199,267 67.3%
Livestock 172 0.1% 546 18.5% 718 0.2%
Commercial 127 0.0% 31 1.0% 158 0.1%
Industrial 2,220 0.8% 37 1.3% 2,257 0.8%
Mining 54 0.0% 652 22.1% 706 0.2%
Power 43,066 14.7% 0 0.0% 43,066 14.5%
Evaporation 38,797 13.2% 0 0.0% 38,797 13.1%
293,058 2,956 296,014
SOURCE:     BRIAN, C. WILSON, P.E., 1997, "Water Use by Categories in New Mexico
River Basins and Irrigated Acreage in 1995", New Mexico State Engineer Office,
Technical Report 49, Santa Fe, NM.
Table 1c: Consumptive Use by Sector In the San Juan Basin
Surface Groundwater Total Consumptive Use
Table 1b: Return Flow by Sector In the San Juan Basin
Surface Groundwater Total Return Flow
Table 1a: Water Diversion by Sector In the San Juan Basin
Surface Groundwater Total Diversion
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Diversion Percent Diversion Percent Diversion Percent
Public            13,498 0.9% 232,035          34.6% 245,533      11.7%
Domestic                    -   0.0% 19,318            2.9% 19,318        0.9%
Agriculture       1,072,419 74.7% 357,505          53.3% 1,429,924   67.9%
Livestock              1,296 0.1% 8,551              1.3% 9,847          0.5%
Commercial                 902 0.1% 13,415            2.0% 14,317        0.7%
Industrial                   25 0.0% 2,563              0.4% 2,588          0.1%
Mining                   65 0.0% 30,538            4.6% 30,603        1.5%
Power                     4 0.0% 6,241              0.9% 6,245          0.3%
Evaporation          346,499 24.2% -                 0.0% 346,499      16.5%
      1,434,708 670,166          2,104,874   
Return Percent Return Percent Return Percent
Public              6,864 1.0% 102,935          41.0% 109,799      11.9%
Domestic                    -   0.0% 10,191            4.1% 10,191        1.1%
Agriculture          667,988 98.9% 122,760          48.9% 790,748      85.4%
Livestock                    -   0.0% 543                 0.2% 543             0.1%
Commercial                 279 0.0% 4,411              1.8% 4,690          0.5%
Industrial                    -   0.0% 1,649              0.7% 1,649          0.2%
Mining                   54 0.0% 8,194              3.3% 8,248          0.9%
Power                    -   0.0% 127                 0.1% 127             0.0%
Evaporation                    -   0.0% -                 0.0% -              0.0%
         675,185 250,810          925,995      
Use Percent Use Percent Use Percent
Public              6,634 0.9% 129,100          30.8% 135,734      11.5%
Domestic                    -   0.0% 9,127              2.2% 9,127          0.8%
Agriculture          404,431 53.2% 234,745          56.0% 639,176      54.2%
Livestock              1,296 0.2% 8,008              1.9% 9,304          0.8%
Commercial                 622 0.1% 9,005              2.1% 9,627          0.8%
Industrial                   25 0.0% 914                 0.2% 939             0.1%
Mining                   11 0.0% 22,344            5.3% 22,355        1.9%
Power                     4 0.0% 6,114              1.5% 6,118          0.5%
Evaporation          346,499 45.6% -                 0.0% 346,499      29.4%
         759,522 419,357          1,178,879   
SOURCE:     BRIAN, C. WILSON, P.E., 1997, "Water Use by Categories in New Mexico
River Basins and Irrigated Acreage in 1995", New Mexico State Engineer Office,
Technical Report 49, Santa Fe, NM.
Table 2c: Consumptive Use by Sector In the Rio Grande Basin
Surface Groundwater Total Consumptive Use
Table 2b: Return Flow by Sector In the Rio Grande Basin
Surface Groundwater Total Return Flow
Table 2a: Water Diversion by Sector In the Rio Grande Basin
Surface Groundwater Total Diversion
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Diversion Percent Diversion Percent Diversion Percent
Public 4,723 1.5% 39,560 8.1% 44,283 5.5%
Domestic 0 0.0% 2,977 0.6% 2,977 0.4%
Agriculture 261,847 82.1% 413,091 84.4% 674,938 83.5%
Livestock 916 0.3% 9,751 2.0% 10,667 1.3%
Commercial 804 0.3% 4,000 0.8% 4,804 0.6%
Industrial 0 0.0% 2,479 0.5% 2,479 0.3%
Mining 69 0.0% 17,804 3.6% 17,873 2.2%
Power 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Evaporation 50,461 15.8% 0 0.0% 50,461 6.2%
318,820 489,662 808,482
Return Percent Return Percent Return Percent
Public 2,999 2.1% 11,408 7.9% 14,407 5.0%
Domestic 0 0.0% 1,550 1.1% 1,550 0.5%
Agriculture 141,071 97.8% 117,295 81.2% 258,366 89.5%
Livestock 0 0.0% 681 0.5% 681 0.2%
Commercial 61 0.0% 2,250 1.6% 2,311 0.8%
Industrial 0 0.0% 362 0.3% 362 0.1%
Mining 49 0.0% 10,863 7.5% 10,912 3.8%
Power 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Evaporation 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
144,180 144,409 288,589
Use Percent Use Percent Use Percent
Public 1,725 1.0% 28,152 8.2% 29,877 5.7%
Domestic 0 0.0% 1,427 0.4% 1,427 0.3%
Agriculture 120,776 69.2% 295,796 85.7% 416,572 80.1%
Livestock 916 0.5% 9,069 2.6% 9,985 1.9%
Commercial 743 0.4% 1,749 0.5% 2,492 0.5%
Industrial 0 0.0% 2,117 0.6% 2,117 0.4%
Mining 20 0.0% 6,941 2.0% 6,961 1.3%
Power 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Evaporation 50,461 28.9% 0 0.0% 50,461 9.7%
174,641 345,251 519,892
SOURCE:     BRIAN, C. WILSON, P.E., 1997, "Water Use by Categories in New Mexico
River Basins and Irrigated Acreage in 1995", New Mexico State Engineer Office,
Technical Report 49, Santa Fe, NM.
Table 3c: Consumptive Use by Sector In the Pecos Basin
Surface Groundwater Total Consumptive Use
Table 3b: Return Flow by Sector In the Pecos Basin
Surface Groundwater Total Return Flow
Table 3a: Water Diversion by Sector In the Pecos Basin
Surface Groundwater Total Diversion
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Diversion Percent Diversion Percent Diversion Percent
Public 0 0.0% 6,507 12.8% 6,507 6.1%
Domestic 0 0.0% 2,346 4.6% 2,346 2.2%
Agriculture 54,757 99.2% 32,845 64.4% 87,602 82.5%
Livestock 452 0.8% 920 1.8% 1,372 1.3%
Commercial 8 0.0% 777 1.5% 785 0.7%
Industrial 0 0.0% 1,112 2.2% 1,112 1.0%
Mining 0 0.0% 6,510 12.8% 6,510 6.1%
Power 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Evaporation 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
55,217 51,017 106,234
Return Percent Return Percent Return Percent
Public 0 0.0% 1,173 6.8% 1,173 1.9%
Domestic 0 0.0% 1,290 7.5% 1,290 2.0%
Agriculture 45,888 100.0% 13,111 76.5% 58,999 93.6%
Livestock 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Commercial 0 0.0% 334 1.9% 334 0.5%
Industrial 0 0.0% 85 0.5% 85 0.1%
Mining 0 0.0% 1,136 6.6% 1,136 1.8%
Power 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Evaporation 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
45,888 17,129 63,017
Use Percent Use Percent Use Percent
Public 0 0.0% 5,333 15.7% 5,333 12.3%
Domestic 0 0.0% 1,056 3.1% 1,056 2.4%
Agriculture 8,879 95.1% 19,734 58.2% 28,613 66.2%
Livestock 452 4.8% 920 2.7% 1,372 3.2%
Commercial 8 0.1% 443 1.3% 451 1.0%
Industrial 0 0.0% 1,027 3.0% 1,027 2.4%
Mining 0 0.0% 5,374 15.9% 5,374 12.4%
Power 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Evaporation 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
9,339 33,887 43,226
SOURCE:     BRIAN, C. WILSON, P.E., 1997, "Water Use by Categories in New Mexico
River Basins and Irrigated Acreage in 1995", New Mexico State Engineer Office,
Technical Report 49, Santa Fe, NM.
Table 4c: Consumptive Use by Sector In the Gila Basin
Surface Groundwater Total Consumptive Use
Table 4b: Return Flow by Sector In the Gila Basin
Surface Groundwater Total Return Flow
Table 4a: Water Diversion by Sector In the Gila Basin
Surface Groundwater Total Diversion
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Diversion Percent Diversion Percent Diversion Percent
Public 2,254 0.7% 3,699 2.9% 5,953 1.4%
Domestic 0 0.0% 822 0.7% 822 0.2%
Agriculture 217,098 70.7% 118,285 93.7% 335,383 77.4%
Livestock 1,037 0.3% 3,268 2.6% 4,305 1.0%
Commercial 277 0.1% 111 0.1% 388 0.1%
Industrial 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Mining 616 0.2% 38 0.0% 654 0.2%
Power 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Evaporation 85,675 27.9% 0 0.0% 85,675 19.8%
306,957 126,223 433,180
Return Percent Return Percent Return Percent
Public 1,001 0.7% 1,951 8.1% 2,952 1.8%
Domestic 0 0.0% 452 1.9% 452 0.3%
Agriculture 134,559 99.1% 21,691 89.7% 156,250 97.7%
Livestock 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Commercial 66 0.0% 58 0.2% 124 0.1%
Industrial 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Mining 197 0.1% 24 0.1% 221 0.1%
Power 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Evaporation 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
135,823 24,176 159,999
Use Percent Use Percent Use Percent
Public 1,233 0.7% 1,748 1.7% 2,981 1.1%
Domestic 0 0.0% 370 0.4% 370 0.1%
Agriculture 82,539 48.2% 96,594 94.7% 179,133 65.6%
Livestock 1,037 0.6% 3,268 3.2% 4,305 1.6%
Commercial 212 0.1% 53 0.1% 265 0.1%
Industrial 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Mining 419 0.2% 13 0.0% 432 0.2%
Power 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Evaporation 85,675 50.1% 0 0.0% 85,675 31.4%
171,115 102,046 273,161
SOURCE:     BRIAN, C. WILSON, P.E., 1997, "Water Use by Categories in New Mexico
River Basins and Irrigated Acreage in 1995", New Mexico State Engineer Office,
Technical Report 49, Santa Fe, NM.
Table 5c: Consumptive Use by Sector In the Canadian Basin
Surface Groundwater Total Consumptive Use
Table 5b: Return Flow by Sector In the Canadian Basin
Surface Groundwater Total Return Flow
Table 5a: Water Diversion by Sector In the Canadian Basin
Surface Groundwater Total Diversion
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Each river is very different and the uses of the river reflect this difference. The Gila River 
has a short reach through New Mexico and is mostly within federal lands. Its consumptive uses 
are mostly agricultural. The Rio Grande, one of our most important water resources, has a reach 
of the entire north/south length of the state. Its uses are diversified and extensive.  
A few general observations can be made from these statistics. The majority use of both 
surface and ground water in all basins is agriculture, Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Percent Consumptive Use of water by Agriculture in 
each Basin  
Basin Surface Groundwater Total  
San Juan 68.0% 0.0% 67.3%  
Rio Grande 53.2% 56.0% 54.2%  
Pecos 69.2% 85.7% 80.1%  
Gila 95.1% 58.2% 66.2%  
Canadian 48.2% 94.7% 65.6%  
All Basins 58.0% 71.6% 63.3%  
 
Other sectors rely mostly on groundwater. Table 7 indicates the ratio of groundwater 
consumptive use to total use by individual sectors in the economy. 
 
Table 7: Ratio of Groundwater Consumptive use  
to total use by sector 
Sector San Juan
Rio 
Grande Pecos Gila Canadian 
Public 5% 95% 94% 100% 59% 
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Domestic 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Agriculture 0% 37% 71% 69% 54% 
Livestock 76% 86% 91% 67% 76% 
Commercial 20% 94% 70% 98% 20% 
Industrial 2% 97% 100% 100%  
Mining 92% 100% 100% 100% 3% 
Power 0% 100%    
Evaporation 0% 0% 0%  0% 
Basin average 1% 36% 66% 78% 37% 
 
As Table 7 indicates, some sectors such as public (municipal water systems) are almost 
entirely dependent on groundwater. This is a very troublesome statistic. Groundwater is a finite 
resource. To the extent that major sectors are mining finite groundwater aquifers, the continued 
viability of the sector depends on switching to renewable resources such as surface. This is the 
major problem in the use of New Mexico water. All the above sectors are essential to the New 
Mexico economy.  The groundwater dependant sectors of the economy must convert from finite 
groundwater to renewable surface supplies2. Yet our ability to facilitate this conversion is very 
poorly developed. New Mexico’s economy will dramatically decline if we cannot develop a 
systematic conversion to renewable water supplies. 
III.  Economic Importance of Water (Gross State Product And Employment By Sector) 
Water is an essential input into all the sectors of the New Mexico economy. The 
following tables outline the relative economic contribution of each sector.  
                                                 
2 We consider conjunctive groundwater use to be a surface or renewable use because the overlying river replenishes 
the groundwater depletion 
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Table 10 indicates the Gross State Product (GSP) by each sector from 1994 to 2000.  The 
New Mexico economy grew during this period at 4.4%. Mining and communications were the 
fastest growing sectors. Agriculture accounts for less than 2% of the GSP, but for the vast 
majority of total water use. Table 11 indicates employment by industry. Agriculture has 
maintained its position relative to the rest of state in employment growth, but again it only 
accounts for about 2% of total employment.  
The state’s tourist, fishing, and recreational industries also contribute to the gross state 
product and are dependent in large part upon instream flows. Total fishing expenditures for New 
Mexico’s rivers and lakes amounts to $175 million per year (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 
1996 Survey). Using a ratio consistent with the national average of fishing expenditures to total 
water based recreation amounts (Value of Recreational Water, Ron Kaiser, Water and Future of 
Kansas Conference, March 2001), New Mexico’s rivers and lakes would have a total water based 
recreational value of $484 million dollars per year in expenditures.
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 Table 10: New Mexico Gross State Product by Industry, 1994-2000    
           
  
(Millions of Current Dollars)                  
Annual Rate Percent of
         
          
of Change Total GSP
Industry 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1994-2000 in 2000
Total Gross State Product $41,772 $42,170 $44,114 $47,829 $48,488 $49,853 $54,364 4.4% 100% 
   Private industries 34,701 34,679 36,409 39,812 40,145 41,275 45,342 4.5% 83.4% 
      Agriculture, forest, fish 818 748 802 974 1,037 1,068 1,043 4.0% 1.9% 
      Mining 2,910 3,116 3,606 3,974 3,660 3,889 5,051 9.2% 9.3% 
      Construction 1,815 1,942 1,875 1,824 1,987 2,081 2,290 3.9% 4.2% 
      Manufacturing 8,657 7,043 7,495 9,212 8,288 7,829 8,862 0.4% 16.3% 
         Durable goods 7,922 6,223 6,624 8,318 7,274 6,888 7,819 -0.2% 14.4% 
         Nondurable goods 735 819 870 894 1,014 941 1,042 5.8% 1.9% 
      Transportation & utilities 3,224 3,216 3,237 3,316 3,580 3,715 4,067 3.9% 7.5% 
      Communications 696 714 790 782 916 1,019 1,156 8.5% 2.1% 
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      Wholesale trade 1,716 1,806 1,871 1,983 2,074 2,102 2,186 4.0% 4.0% 
      Retail trade 3,589 3,814 3,953 4,304 4,434 4,629 4,838 5.0% 8.9% 
      F.I.R.E. 5,125 5,536 5,854 6,138 6,436 6,831 7,219 5.7% 13.3% 
      Services 6,848 7,459 7,716 8,087 8,648 9,131 9,787 6.0% 18.0% 
   Government          7,071 7,491 7,705 8,017 8,343 8,578 9,022 4.1% 16.6%
      Federal civilian 1,847 1,888 1,913 1,953 2,046 2,033 2,154 2.6% 4.0% 
      Federal military 874 930 962 923 883 868 881 0.1% 1.6% 
      State and local 4,350 4,673 4,829 5,141 5,414 5,677 5,987 5.3% 11.0% 
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Table 11: Covered Wage and Salary Employment, By Major Industrial Sector   
New Mexico, 1990-2000   
                Rate of Percent of 
Sector  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Increase Total Employment
GRAND TOTAL 636,222 660,481 671,579 683,202 693,217 701,280 717,594 2.0%  
Total Private 494,125 515,349 525,048 533,943 543,558 550,980 564,431 2.2%  79%
  Ag. For. & Fish 14,230 14,856 15,122 15,236 15,814 15,848 16,169 2.1%  2.3%
  Mining 15,677 15,839 15,415 15,726 15,091 13,562 15,285 -0.4%  2%
  Construction 41,583 44,145 43,035 42,977 43,557 44,141 44,970 1.3%  6%
  Manufacturing 44,529 45,233 45,910 46,353 44,902 42,316 42,886 -0.6%  6%
  TPU 28,471 29,211 30,083 30,700 31,840 33,842 35,190 3.5%  5%
  Wholesale Trade 27,356 27,025 27,058 28,177 28,238 27,909 27,652 0.2%  4%
  Retail Trade 128,986 134,189 137,237 139,891 142,385 143,529 146,408 2.1%  20%
  FIRE 28,630 28,681 30,180 29,929 30,084 31,480 30,897 1.3%  4%
  Services 164,655 176,042 180,311 184,391 191,295 197,952 204,669 3.6%  29%
  Non-Classifiable 10 128 774 562 352 402 306 57.8%  0%
Total Government 142,097 145,132 146,531 149,259 149,659 150,300 153,162 1.2%  21%
  Federal 31,680 31,213 30,540 30,106 29,964 29,633 30,436 -0.7%  4%
  State 39,086 39,687 39,248 42,524 43,533 44,262 45,288 2.5%  6%
  Local 71,330 74,231 76,742 76,629 76,162 76,406 77,438 1.4%  11%
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III. Water Values 
The economic value of water depends on the time, location, and type of use. For 
agriculture and industry, water is an economic factor of production to be used with other factors 
such as labor and capital to produce income. The value of water is measured by what it 
contributes to income.  For domestic use or recreation water is more of a final good, a 
commodity. In the following sections, we outline the value of water in these uses. 
Value in Urban Use 
Water is essential for life, but the reality is that people in the U.S. use a lot more water 
than is absolutely necessary to sustain life. The use of water has tremendous convenience value 
in a modern household. Besides cooking, washing and cleaning, the American household uses 
water to maintain an attractive domestic environment in landscapes and lawns. All these uses of 
water are non-essential from a survival perspective but are greatly desired. Economists thus 
analyze water as an economic commodity for which there is a large urban demand. The 
willingness of people to pay for and then use water in every day activities is what gives water an 
urban economic value. 
Economic value is derived from the concept of demand – the amount of water that people 
use at alternative prices. The flip side of demand is the dollar amount people are willing to pay 
for additional water given that they are already using a certain quantity. Economists label this 
concept willingness to pay or WTP and we use it as the measure of long term annual value of 
water.  It is a long standing economic principle that if one can derive a relationship between the 
amount of water people might use at different water prices (a demand curve), then the “inverse” 
demand function is a measure of WTP and economic value.3 
 
3 We employ the concept of consumer surplus to measure change in economic values. 
The analysis here employs research on water done by Ari Michelsen, J. Thomas 
McGuckin and Donna Stumpf in the Effectiveness of Residential Water Conservation Price and 
Non-price Programs in Urban Areas in the Western U.S., American Water Works Association - 
Research Foundation, December 1998. Seven study areas were selected, and with the 
cooperation of water utilities in three southwestern states, information on residential water 
consumption, rate structures, revenues and non-price conservation programs covering the period 
from 1980 through mid-1995 was collected. The study area cities are: Los Angeles and San 
Diego, California; Broomfield and Denver, Colorado; and Albuquerque, Las Cruces and Santa 
Fe, New Mexico.  Similarities and differences in residential water use, prices and rate structures, 
climatic conditions and socioeconomic characteristics across the study areas provide an excellent 
cross-section of cities in the southwestern United States. These cities also exhibit a wide range of 
non-price conservation programs, from cities that have numerous concurrent conservation 
programs to cities that have yet to implement non-price conservation programs.  
What are the general findings of the Michelsen study? Water price has a significant and 
negative impact on water use, but water demand is very price inelastic, more so than has been 
suggested in other studies. The highest elasticity estimate was for summer use (approximately -
0.30). At this degree of consumer responsiveness water utilities could double their water rates 
and expect, at a maximum, only a 30 percent decrease in water use during the peak season. 
Non-price conservation programs appear to be effective if the water utility achieves a 
critical mass of programs.  For Los Angeles, San Diego and Denver, the number of non-price 
programs has had the desired effect. For cities with fewer programs or relatively new experience 
with conservation programs, non-price programs had no observable effect on demand. 
Conservation programs work independently of a drought environment, such as California’s in the 
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late 1980's and early 1990's and continue to work after the drought conditions have ceased. 
Conservation programs may be ultimately necessary simply to counteract an exogenous long-
term increase in residential use.  
The climate affects residential use in predictable ways.  Water use is strongly correlated 
with average monthly temperature and seasonal variation in temperature. Precipitation was 
consistently insignificant in all models. All cities in this analysis are semi-arid to arid in climate 
and thus the ratio of evapotranspiration to precipitation is much greater than one. Landscape 
watering is necessary if one wants to maintain traditional residential lawns and trees. Random 
and infrequent rains do not change residential watering patterns to a significant degree.  Other 
variables, exogenous to a water utility, such as residential income and the size of the city have a 
relative minor impact on residential use.  
We use the empirical demand curve results from the Michelsen study by applying the 
function to the climatic and socioeconomic conditions of Albuquerque, Las Cruces, Santa Fe and 
El Paso. The Michelsen model has a demand elasticity of -0.30. The demand model is 
remarkably effective in predicting water use in the four cities.  The law of demand implies that 
people will use water up to a level where the value of an additional unit equals the cost of 
purchase. In Albuquerque this is about $1.59 per 1000 gallons. This water price is known as the 
marginal price. Since Albuquerque uses an increasing block rate structure, this is the price that 
applies to purchasing the next 1000 gallons for an average residential consumption level. 
But what were to happen if future water supplies do not keep up with population growth? 
The amount of water use per household would have to be reduced. Table 12 outlines this 
potential situation for Santa Fe, Albuquerque, Las Cruces and El Paso. As water use is cut back 
people are willing to pay a higher value per unit, but are unable to obtain it. These unfilled 
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demands are an economic loss.  In Albuquerque, water sells for approximately $1.59 per 1000g 
per month. If consumers are forced to cut back, their willingness to pay for additional water  
increases to $1.67. The consumer is willing to buy more water at the going price of $1.59 but 
cannot because there is no additional water. The situation is what economists call an increase in 
the implicit price of water. These prices are indicated in bold and italics next to the current 
marginal price for each city.  The change in willingness to pay times the amount of curtailment is 
the economic loss that results from keeping the water supply constant in the context of increasing 
population. Table 12 indicates the economic loss if each of the four cities cannot expand water 
supplies.
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 For Albuquerque, the curtailment due to one year of growth would be from 14.7 to 14.5 
(000) gallons per month per household. This amounts to an annual economic loss per household 
of $4.32.  [(14,700 – 14,500) x ($1.59 + $1.67)/2] The total loss for the city on annual basis is 
$469,346. By obtaining 1500 extra aft of water, citizens of Albuquerque would avoid the loss. 
The long term annual value of additional water is then the total economic loss divided by the 
amount of additional water that eliminates the loss, $313 [$469,346 / 1500] per aft (annual 
basis). Table 12 indicates the long term annual value of water (“willingness to pay for additional 
water”) for urban use along the Rio Grande. Santa Fe has very high value because water is in 
very short supply and very expensive to the household. Albuquerque and Las Cruces have 
approximately the same value. El Paso has a higher value reflecting its current shortage. Table 
12 also indicates the water right value, the long term annual value capitalized at 6.5%. A water 
right is considered a capital asset that produces an annual return – the long term annual value 
outlined above. Capitalization is method for determining capital value from annual value. 
Capitalized value is similar to the amount in a savings account that has 6.5% interest rate. All 
these cities have active water supply and water right acquisition programs.  Estimates for other 
urban areas such as Roswell or Farmington are not available, but urban water values would be of 
similar magnitude to Las Cruces.  
 
Agricultural Value for Water 
Often people overstate water’s agricultural value because other factors of production are 
equally important. To be sure there would be little New Mexico agriculture except ranching 
without water, but this is also true of capital, land and labor. When we examine the value of 
water in agriculture, we must net out the returns to these other factors. Water has a high value 
during the middle of the season when the expenses associated with crop production have already 
occurred. On a long-term basis, the value of water depends on long term profits net of all 
operating and capital expenses. The level of profits (or return on assets) in agriculture is very low 
and sometime even negative. This does not imply that a farmer should be willing to trade his 
water rights for low value. He or she may have other values associated with farming.  
There are four different agricultural water values depending on timeframe: (1) intra-
seasonal, (2) seasonal, (3) long run annual value, and (4) long run water right value. The intra-
seasonal value for water is the appropriate perspective once the major planting expenses have 
occurred.   Farming incurs a majority of costs upfront in the season. Once these expenses have 
occurred, the value of water is approximately the gross value of the crop minus harvest costs. 
This value would be the appropriate framework if the farmer were to lease his water after the 
season had started – say for the month of July and August. These values are at their highest 
levels because so much has already been invested in growing the crops.  
The seasonal value of water nets out all operating costs except costs that still remain 
(fixed costs) such as capital costs, labor, and management. If a farmer were to lease his seasonal 
allotment of water and subsequently not use water, the seasonal value is the appropriate estimate 
of water. These water values would represent the agricultural value of water in a seasonal water 
bank. 
Long-term annual value of the water is net profits after all costs that may be attributable 
to water. This is the cost of not farming. In ceasing operations, the farmer would sell all 
agricultural assets such as tractors and equipment and seek other employment (or retire). The 
long term annual value is the net loss of income once all costs are accounted for. These values 
are often low in agriculture.  
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Long-term water right values in agriculture are the annual value of water capitalized at a 
rate of return equivalent to other agricultural assets.  Estimate by economists have indicated the 
long-term return to agricultural assets is about 2% per year. Note that this is less than the 
capitalization factor of 6.5% for cities. Cities must consider their cost of capital when purchasing 
assets. Farmers tend to be more tenacious when holding on to their assets. 
Table 13 indicates the economic values of water in agricultural production at locations 
along the Rio Grande for each timeframe. The value of water generally increases towards the 
South because of increased length of growing season and the more flexibility in growing 
different crops.  Intra-seasonal values of water vary from a low of $154 per aft to a high $450. 
Seasonal values range from $34 to $126. Long term value of water ranges from $0 to $54 on an 
annual basis. Using the long-term annual value as a basis for capitalized value, water right values 
range from $0 (in that specific use) to $1,075. It should be noted that the values reported here are 
estimates of the value in use and do not represent actual water prices.  
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Table 13: Agricultural Water Values in the Rio Grande Basin (2001) 1/
Northern
Mountains Bernalillo Socorro Dona Ana
Representative Farm Size 40 100 200 500
Water Diversion per acre
Surface 2.28 3.47 3.27 3
Groundwater 2
Total water Diversion (farm gate) 91.2 347 654 2500
Water delivery Cost per aft
Surface $7 $8 $6 $19
Groundwater
Within season value of water
      Gross returns minus harvest costs $25,932 $53,285 $129,098 $888,387
      Intra seasonal value of water $284 $154 $197 $355
Seasonal value of water
        - Cash operating expenses $19,312 $25,512 $106,938 $638,805
      Net above Cash operating expense $6,620 $27,773 $22,160 $249,582
      Seasonal value of water $73 $80 $34 $100
Long Term Value of Water (Annual basis)
       Net above Cash operating expense $6,620 $27,773 $22,160 $249,582
         - Fixed expense $1,747 $6,936 $9,973 $41,192
         - Labor and Management $1,953 $7,955 $14,715 $73,781
         - Capital Expenses $898 $4,121 $8,135 $28,456
       Net Return to land water and risk $2,022 $8,761 -$10,663 $106,153
       Long term value of water $22 $25 $0 $42
Value of Water Right in Agriculture 
@ 2% capitalization rate $1,108.55 $1,262.39 $500.00 $2,123.06
1/ Source NM Cooperative Extension Service Costs and Returns Estimates 2001 (projected)  
 
 
Table 14 indicates agricultural water values for the Pecos River Basin. 
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     Table 14: Agricultural Water Values in the Pecos River  Basin (2001) 1/
Carlsbad Artesia Roswell De Baca
Representative Farm Size 200 500 640 200
Water Diversion per acre
Surface 2.88 2.7
Groundwater 3.54 3.43
Total water Diversion (farm gate) 576 1770 2195.2 540
Water delivery Cost per aft
Surface $12.00 $12.60
Groundwater $24.48 $22.92
Within season value of water
      Gross returns minus harvest costs $120,654 $415,637 $389,747 $202,339
      Intra seasonal value of water $209.47 $234.82 $177.55 $374.70
Seasonal value of water
        - Cash operating expenses $84,280 $221,893 $138,239 $141,339
      Net above Cash operating expense $36,374 $193,744 $251,508 $61,000
      Seasonal value of water $63 $109 $115 $113
Long Term Value of Water (Annual basis)
       Net above Cash operating expense $36,374 $193,744 $251,508 $61,000
         - Fixed expense $9,789 $41,151 $45,326 $9,924
         - Labor and Management $14,835 $63,207 $58,753 $17,230
         - Capital Expenses $7,834 $24,050 $21,872 $9,345
       Net Return to land water and risk $3,916 $65,336 $125,557 $24,501
       Long term value of water $7 $37 $57 $45
Value of Water Right in Agriculture $500.00 $1,845.65 $2,859.81 $2,268.61
@ 2% capitalization rate
1/ Source NM Cooperative Extension Service Costs and Returns Estimates 2001 (projected)  
 
Values are similar to the Rio Grande but do not exhibit a North – South trend. 
 
Instream and Environmental Water Values 
There is substantial evidence that New Mexicans greatly value natural rivers and riparian 
habitat. Several studies by Berrens et al.4 at the University of New Mexico, in which they 
                                                 
4 Barrens, Robert P., Alok K. Bohara, Hank Jenkins-Smith, Carol Silva, Philip Ganderton and David Brookshire. “A 
joint investigation of public support and public use values; case of instream flows in New Mexico” Ecological 
Economics 27 (1998). 
 24
surveyed New Mexican opinions about instream water, indicate a willingness to pay $80 
annually per household to maintain minimum instream flow and the riparian environment along 
the river bank of the major rivers of New Mexico. How much water is required to maintain eco-
systems is subject to much debate, but some persuasive estimates can be derived. We examine 
the case of Rio Grande Bosque.  
The Bosque riparian habitat is a complete foliage cover for the land area adjacent to the 
river. The Rio Grande Bosque is defined for purposes of this report as the riparian habitat 
between the flood levies of the Rio Grande from Cochiti Dam and San Acacia. A GIS survey of 
this area estimated this land area to 37,300 acres. The consumptive use of the Bosque per acre 
per annum has been estimated by the US Bureau of Reclamation, Albuquerque Area Office as 
43.79 inches (3.65 acre feet)5. Applying this consumptive use value to 37,300 acres results in a 
136,145 aft total quantity of water beneficially used.  In addition to the consumptive use, a 
continuous stream flow particularly around San Acacia is required to keep indigenous species 
such as endangered silvery minnow alive and well. An informal estimate to maintain a 
continuous flow at 15cfs is 30,000 aft of consumptive water use over what is regularly used by 
the river.  
 
The Barrens group at UNM has estimated the value of maintaining a riparian 
environment at $80 annual per household ($55 for riparian environments in general and $25 for 
the endangered species such as the minnow).  For the approximately 210,000 households in the 
upper Rio Grande Basin (above Elephant Butte), Table 15 indicates the value of water used for 
preservation of the Bosque and a minimum instream flow. Total annual value of maintaining 
                                                 
5 U.S. Bureau of Reclamation Report. Middle Rio Grande Water Assessment – Estimates of Consumptive Use 
Requirements for Irrigations and Riparian Vegetation, Table 11. 
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riparian environment and endangered species is $16,800,000. Given the consumptive use of 
166,145 aft for this purpose, water for instream flow and riparian maintenance has a value of 
approximately $100 per aft. [16,800,000 / 166,145 = $101]. Because maintaining the 
environment is a public good, we use a 2% capitalization rate. 
Water Requirements
Consumptive Total
Acreage Use per Acre Use
37,300 3.65 136,145
Minmum Instream Flow for Minnow - consumptive use 30,000
Total Water required for maintaing habitat 166,145
Value of Maintaining Riparian Environment
Number of Value per
Household Household Subtotal
Annual Value of Bosque 210000 $55.00 $11,550,000
Minimum instream flow Number of Value per
   value for Silvery minnow Household Household Subtotal
210000 $25.00 $5,250,000
Total value of minimum flow requirement $16,800,000
Long Term Annual Value per acre foot $101.12
Water right Value
Capitalization Rate 2% $5,055.82
Table 15 :  Consumptive Water Use and Value for Bosque and Instream Flow
 
 
Summary of Long Term Annual Water and Water Right Values in New Mexico 
The value of water to the New Mexico economy varies by use. Urban uses have long 
term annual values of $200 to over $4,000 per aft depending on the availability of supplies. 
Environmental values are $101 per aft.  Agricultural values vary from $0 to $50 per aft. Figure 1 
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is a map of New Mexico’s major rivers and urban water values. Two values are indicated; the 
long term annual value and the water right value.  
Figure 1: Urban Water Values (annual) and Willingness
to pay for Additional Water Rights
Farmington San Juan
long term annual value: $202 River
water right value: $3,108
long term annual value:
water right value:
Santa Fe
$4,315
$66,380   Canadian River
Albuquerque
$313
$4,814
Pecos River 
Roswell
long term annual value: $312
water right value: $4,800
Las Cruces
$292
$4,487
El Pas
long term annual value:
water right value:
Rio Grande River         
    Gila River
long term annual value:
water right value:
o
long term annual value: $456
water right value: $7,012
 
Figure 2 indicates the seasonal value of water as a productive input into agriculture. This 
is what a farmer might be willing to lease water for on a short term basis. Also indicated is the 
capitalized water right based on long term annual value (not shown) in this use.  As indicated 
earlier, the water right is capitalized at 2% that corresponds to the return on capital in agriculture. 
This is a lower rate than other investments, but farmers have consistently shown a willingness to 
invest in their farms even with a low rate of return. 
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     Figure 2: Agricultural Water Values (seasonal) and Water Right Values
San Juan Northern Irrigated Areas
seasonal $56 seasonal $73
water right $500 water right $1,100 Canadian River
Arch Hurley
seasonal $199
Middle Rio Grande water right $3,800
seasonal $80
water right $1,250 Pecos River    
De Baca
seasonal $113
         Socorro water right $2,250
seasonal $34
water right $500 Roswell Hagerman
seasonal $115
Rio Grande River      water right $2,850
Artesia
    Gila River seasonal $109
water right $1,850
Elephant Butte Irrigation District Carlsbad Irrigation District
seasonal $100 seasonal $63
water right $2,700 water right $500
 
 
Comparing Figures 1 and 2 indicates the significant gains from trade of water rights. A 
farmer in the Middle Rio Grande values a water right used in agriculture at $1,250 per aft. 
Albuquerque would be willing to pay up to $4,800 per acre-foot. The actual selling price would 
depend on market conditions. Let us assume the going market price is $4,000 per aft. This is 
approximately the price of a senior right in the Middle Grande. The farmer would gain $2,750 in 
net income over what he or she makes using the water in farming. Note that the farmer does not 
have to quit farming; he or she could sell 25% of his water rights and go to more efficient 
irrigation and growing low water using crops. The point is that selling water right is his or her 
decision. Albuquerque also benefits from this deal by obtaining more water to satisfy demand. 
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Albuquerque is netting for its water consumers a positive net return of $900 in purchasing this 
water right.  
 
But this brings us to the central point. A farmer cannot easily sell a water right that has 
not been defined or adjudicated.  Past experience indicates that there are enormous transaction 
costs with selling a non-adjudicated “water right”. The transaction costs completely wipe out 
potential gains by both the farmer and the City of Albuquerque. Our experience is that 
transaction costs of water exchange can run as high as $20,000 per aft in legal and SEO hearing 
costs. The example deal above cannot be consummated even though both the farmer and 
Albuquerque would clearly benefit. The current situation of undefined water rights is costing 
New Mexicans an enormous price in flexibility to buy and sell water rights. 
 
IV. Water Allocation in New Mexico  
New Mexico uses appropriative water law to allocate our water resource. Appropriative 
water law grants, in form of water rights, senior appropriators priority to available water relative 
to junior appropriators.  An appropriator is a water user who diverts surface water from a river or 
pumps from groundwater and puts it to beneficial use. A water district (or a municipality for that 
matter) that diverts water from a river into a distribution system is just a collection of individual 
appropriators. When water is short, senior appropriators are able to satisfy their historical use. 
Junior appropriators must wait until senior water rights are satisfied. (The terms of senior versus 
junior appropriators are actually misconceptions; there is a continuum of seniority based on 
when a user first put water to beneficial use). In water short years, water is allocated down the 
priority (seniority) list until the water runs out. There is break point at which more junior users 
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do not receive water that year. What can a junior appropriator who needs water do? The simple 
solution is to purchase senior water rights through a market exchange and no longer be junior. 
Another short-term option is to lease temporary water through a local water exchange. This 
ability to purchase water rights and transfer use is crucial. It establishes water rights as valuable 
property. The transfer is contingent to a finding by the SEO that other water users are not 
impaired – this can be generally accomplished if water transfer is limited to the amount of 
original consumptive use. 
Compact obligations often cause a great wringing of hands, but the concept of a compact 
obligation is straightforward. Not all water in New Mexico’s rivers belongs to New Mexico. For 
example of the approximately 1.06 million aft of water that flows on average into the Otowi 
gauging station on the northern Rio Grande, 750,000 aft must be delivered to Elephant Butte 
Reservoir for use by the “Texas” side of the compact and to Mexico by treaty. This leaves 
approximately 300,000 aft of water for users in the Middle Rio Grande. One of the curiosities of 
the Colorado-New Mexico-Texas compact is that more than 50% of water delivered to the Texas 
side of the compact is actually used by New Mexicans in Elephant Butte Irrigation District. 
Compact obligations are a fact of water, - no different than nature is variable in its supply. We 
can only use the water that is there and legally ours.  
In a dynamic economy, water uses and users change. Where there was originally an 
agricultural based economy, over time the economy changes into urban and other uses. This is 
certainly indicated by Table 10. At one time New Mexico was mostly an agricultural and mining 
based economy. Now these sectors count for approximately 12% of total state product.  This is 
both progress and economic growth. But for this progress to continue new water users must be 
able to bid and purchase existing water rights or groundwater permits. There is very little water 
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in New Mexico that has not been appropriated for use. But this not a problem, there is plenty of 
water for New Mexico to grow and prosper for a very long time.  
 
Adjudication, a prerequisite for Working Water Law  
There is a major problem with New Mexico water allocation and water law. This problem 
is so substantial that all other water problems can not be solved unless this issue is expediently 
addressed. The majority of surface water users in New Mexico do not have adjudicated water 
rights. This is similar to claiming land without a deed. Without adjudication there are many false 
claims to water. The OSE has estimated that there are three times more claims to water than what 
is actually available in the Rio Grande. It is not that OSE does not recognize that it is essential to 
establish who owns what water rights; it is that the adjudication process has taken many years to 
hear claims. There are legal obstacles such as suits, tribal issues; the list goes on and on. But the 
bottom line is that we cannot afford to adjudicate at the pace we are currently preceding. Without 
a complete adjudication, the question of who gets what water becomes very murky.  The OSE 
has taken the taken the position that in times of water shortages everyone must conserve. But 
consider a huge company like Intel. The Rio Rancho plant produces billions of dollars of 
computer chips and employs thousands of New Mexicans – it is a huge component of our 
economy. They certainly cannot afford to have their water consumption curtailed. If required to 
do so, they will simply leave for a state that is more reliable. With adjudication, Intel would 
purchase sufficient senior water rights to keep going under all circumstances.  
There is no priority without an adjudication process. This is the formal determination of 
the date at which water was originally put to beneficial use and whether it has continued to 
beneficially used. The original permit to divert water (appropriation) is not sufficient to allocated 
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water among competing uses because it does not establish priority relative to other users. The 
variability of the Rio Grande illustrates the importance of priority assignment. Figure 3 indicates 
the flows of the Rio Grande measured at the Otowi gauging station. The heavy horizontal line is 
the annual average of little more than 1,000,000 aft per year. But notice there are numerous 
drought years when the flow is 500,000 aft or less. At 500,000 aft of annual flow, 286,000 aft is 
due at Elephant Butte Dam b y the Compact, leaving 214,000 aft available for the Middle Rio 
Grande. But the Middle Rio Grande consumptively uses 300,000 aft. Who is first in line to get 
the 214,000 aft? This is the purpose of priority – to allocate the available water among many 
users. Let us put it another way, a water right is not a guarantee of water but a place in line to get 
water.  
Figure 3: Flow of Rio Grande at Otowi Gauging Station
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Adjudication improves water diversion efficiency. The test of beneficial use is a stern 
master. It raises the bar on efficiency that irrigation districts must achieve in running their 
operations. An adjudication hearing would ask the question why these amounts of diversion to 
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only irrigate this amount of acreage. For example, Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District 
diverts, on average, 560,000 aft to irrigate approximately 50,000 acres6.  The District has a farm 
delivery to diversion ratio of 31% (Ibid, Table 3.8). Other districts achieve much higher 
diversion efficiency such as EBID which has averaged 55% diversion efficiency.  If MRGCD 
were adjudicated and allowed only to divert the amount of water that it can beneficially use, with 
benchmark efficiency of other districts, its total diversions would be reduced by 240,000 aft of 
water - water that would be left in the river channel. This would go long ways in helping 
endangered species such as the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow.   
The State of New Mexico needs to expedite adjudication.  It is the cornerstone to solving 
our water crisis. A legitimate question is that given that we do not enforce our appropriation 
doctrine, how have we gotten along over many years of drought and increasing demand for 
water? The answer is that we have mortgaged our future by taking our water from limited 
groundwater aquifers and from the very fragile riparian environment that surrounds our rivers. 
To put it bluntly, we are sucking our heritage dry. The following two sections outline what has 
happen to our groundwater and environmental water use. 
 
Groundwater 
New Mexico is a growing state and most of this growth is occurring in middle to large 
cities. But historically, cities have appropriated very little surface water. Groundwater accounts 
for 95% of the supply for public and domestic water use in the Rio Grande. This use of water is 
increasing. In the middle Rio Grande, groundwater diversion for public and domestic use grew at 
annual rate 3.0% between 1985 and 1995 (Wilson Brian “Water Use in New Mexico in 1985”, 
                                                 
6 Evaluation of the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District Irrigation System and Measurement Program, S.S. 
PAPADOPULOS & ASSOCIATES, INC. Boulder, Colorado, December 2002 
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NMSEO, Technical report 46.  This rate of growth in groundwater use cannot be sustained. But 
neither can it be arbitrarily limited. New Mexico can develop a no growth policy, but our 
economy would decline. There would be no new investment. Maybe for retired or wealthy 
people this would be OK, but for everyone else, salaries would decrease and unemployment 
increase.  
A different set of rules allocates groundwater among competing users. Groundwater is 
considered a public good held in trust for citizens of New Mexico. The SEO, on a finding that 
groundwater depletion out of a given aquifer is significant, declares it a closed basin and then 
regulates groundwater pumping.  Since most aquifers are finite, the SEO sets the amount of 
pumping so that the aquifer has as least a 40-year life. This is very important point. In New 
Mexico, there is no sustainable yield of an aquifer that is not conjunctive to surface flows 
(conjunctive is further described below). Groundwater recharge is minimal in New Mexico. 
Users are granted a permit to pump a specific amount of water. Long-term water past 40 years is 
not guaranteed. As users pump out the aquifer, the depth to water and drawdown will increase, 
and thus depletion increases the costs of pumping to all users. Once an aquifer is declared and 
pumping regulations set, the SEO generally does not permit new applications. However, 
pumping permits can be traded from one user to another, as long as the net effect on the aquifer 
is the same.  What happens after the 40 years of depletion of an aquifer? History is full of 
circumstances in which a society depleted its natural resources. Either a society learns to adopt a 
sustainable resource base or become, as in many areas of the west associated with mining, a 
ghost town. 
A more complicated set of rules applies to groundwater that is conjunctive to surface 
water. Many aquifers are connected to a river in that there is flow between the river and the 
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aquifer. Pumping out of the aquifer creates a deficit that the river will eventually recharge. A 
major complication is that the recharge process may take decades. But the net effect is that the 
river is drawn down as it replenishes the depleted aquifers. This affects downstream surface 
users and compact obligations. To counteract the effect on surface flows, often the SEO will 
require junior groundwater users to purchase senior surface water rights to neutralize the effect 
on the river. We have not implemented this part of the law either - witness the Pecos river valley. 
The state of New Mexico has been spending millions of dollars in buying or leasing water to 
meet Compact obligations to Texas caused by excessive groundwater pumping. In essence the 
state of New Mexico is buying out Pecos valley agriculture to ship water to Texas (just a side 
note, by the time the water in the Pecos reaches the New Mexico/Texas border it is too salty to 
be of any value).  
A Lower Pecos Valley Regional Water Plan approved by the NM Interstate Streams 
Commission in 2002 has an innovative method to meet compact obligations. Junior groundwater 
irrigators in a water short year would pump out of the aquifer directly into the river enough water 
to meet compact obligations. In water surplus years, the river would naturally replenish the 
depleted aquifers and still satisfy compact obligations and senior water rights. The junior water 
right holders would bear the cost of the program, but this would be small price considering the 
alternative, a shut down of groundwater based agricultural production. 
Anther conjunctive relationship between river and shallow aquifers is return flow. 
Irrigators put on more water than is actually required by the crop. This is necessary even with 
very efficient irrigation. The evapotranspiration process of the crops builds up salts in the root 
zone. Sufficient salt buildup will reduce yields or worse kill the crop. Using leaching fractions, a 
technique of putting on more water that the crop uses and leaching the salt down below the root 
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zone, will control salt build up. Eventually the salty component of the leaching fraction enters 
the shallow aquifer. Using a series of drainage ditches, the salty return flow eventually makes it 
back to the river. This leaching and return flow process has the advantage that it maintains crop 
production, but with repeated diversions and return flows, salinity (often referred to as TDS) 
builds up in the river. The Rio Grande enters the state with very low TDS (less than 250 ppm) 
but exits the state with high TDS levels above 1000 ppm.  
How would adjudication solve the overuse of our groundwater resources?  Simply put 
adjudicated rights will increase in value as the aquifers are depleted. It has always been cheaper 
and easier to use groundwater for public and domestic use. But with increasing market prices on 
scarce groundwater supplies, new users would consider obtaining surface water rights. Would 
this not reduce the agricultural economy? True, there would be less acreage in production, but 
since water right holders are typically the original farmers, the value of their water rights would 
more than compensate for the reduction in crop or livestock income. Farmers would be wealthier 
and the cities could grow with new - if not necessarily cheap water sources.  
 
Water Adjudication would protect the Environment 
The real loser in our water management policies are our rivers and riparian environment 
because they lack any legal protection under state law. Ask any real estate agent in Albuquerque 
what potential new residents think of the last remaining forest belt along the river in otherwise 
desert ocean as they fly into the Albuquerque Sunport. The middle Rio Grande Bosque is a 
narrow stretch of land between the flood levies that supports the natural cottonwood forest. A 
curious footnote is that the state engineer does not consider the forest a beneficial use, but 
MRGCD officials acknowledge that the trees provide a braking or energy absorbing cushion 
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against flood waters that protects the levies from deterioration. This forest is a natural resource 
that New Mexico can scarcely afford to squander, but it is in deep peril. As indicated earlier, the 
Bosque along the middle Rio Grande is approximately 37,000 acres of riparian habitat. 
Originally, cottonwood was the dominant plant species, but invader species of salt cedar and 
Russian Olive have replaced large sections. One interesting note is that the consumptive water 
use of cottonwood is less than salt cedar, so simply removing salt cedar and allowing 
cottonwoods to return would decrease water use by the Bosque and add water to the stream 
channel.  If the Bosque were managed to maintain the original cottonwood forest, the Bosque 
would have a consumptive use of 136,000 aft. But consider the SEO. This water use is not 
currently defined as beneficial use. With incomplete adjudication in the Rio Grande and during 
periods of drought, the office must somehow allocate water and meet Compact obligations. 
During a period of sustained drought, when claimants to available water are pitted against each 
other, it would be extremely temping to take the water from the trees by cutting them down. 
There is no protection against this and it has already occurred along the reach of the Rio Grande 
from Elephant Butte Dam to the Texas border and over on the Pecos River. 
New Mexico needs to adjudicate its surface and groundwater. But expedited 
adjudications will require financial commitment. This is the purpose of the proposed water 
conservation fee.   
 
Water Conservation 
During the process of adjudication, it is important that New Mexico water users conserve 
water as much as is economically feasible. Water conservation really should only be undertaken 
if it makes economic sense and there are many water conservation proposals that do not. For 
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example, drip irrigation conserves water relative to traditional flood or furrow techniques 
(actually drip irrigation reduces the amount of diversion and farm delivery, but the technology 
does not reduce the consumptive water use of the crop). Drip irrigation is very capital intensive 
and expensive. It makes sense for only a very few high valued crops. For most farmers, drip 
irrigation would be an investment disaster possibly causing financial ruin. This is not good 
conservation. Another dubious program is the conversion of evaporative to central air cooling. 
New Mexico’s low humidity and dry climate makes evaporative cooling (also known as swamp 
coolers) a very low cost source of air conditioning. Evaporative cooling does require some water, 
but sometimes perspective is lost. Central air conditioning requires considerable amounts of 
expensive electricity (electrical utilities are generally for this program). Central air conditioning 
costs can be several hundred dollars a month compared to the evaporative cooling bill that is 
generally much less than a hundred. The conversion to central air is a conservation program that 
asks the consumer to incur hundreds of dollars of electrical bills (say $500 per summer) to save a 
few thousands gallons of water. Consider a summer savings of 3,000 gallons - in Albuquerque, 
this is about $6 of water. The conversion to central air costs $500 to save $6 – this does not make 
economic sense. 
There are low cost and effective water conservation programs, voluntary landscape 
programs, better residential irrigation of lawns and landscapes, reduced water using appliances. 
With incentive packages, these conservation programs can make economic sense. Residential 
water programs can reduce residential water use by 10 to 15% (ibid, Michelson et al.). There are 
improved irrigation incentive programs – such as low cost loans (adopted in the Central value of 
California) – that can induce farmers to implement more conserving irrigation. Here however, 
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economics is underlying incentive. A farmer will adopt water conservation if it makes economic 
sense.  
Other conservation programs concentrate on water providers and water utilities. By 
reducing losses and leakages, water providers can lower water diversions by as much as 20%. 
Programs such as ditch lining and water pipe rehabilitation are expensive and these programs 
need federal and state assistance to work.  
Metering of water uses is a necessary water conservation program. It is the basis for more 
efficient water management. Metering provides quantitative metrics to guide a farmer’s, 
homeowner’s and municipality’s water use. Metering more precisely measures regional and state 
water budgets and is necessary to enforce effective administration of water rights. Metering 
allows for accurate measure of the amount of water saved by implementation of other 
conservation measures and has been demonstrated to significantly reduce water use by as much 
as 20 percent in some studies.
 
V. A Water Conservation Fee 
We propose that the state should impose a water conservation fee on all uses of water. 
The benefits of a water conservation charge are several-fold. Charging a fee increases awareness 
of water use, which in turn leads to conservation. If the fee is set at a sufficient level, it can 
provide an incentive for conservation. Thirdly, the funds generated by a fee can be used to 
address water related needs in the state. Though fees or new taxes are unpopular, a user fee on 
water is very necessary. 
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1. NM “no charge” policy for water ignores the true costs of managing, allocating and 
supplying water, our most important resource. No other resource in the State is 
utilized/extracted without some fees. 
2. We do not value what we receive for free. The low cost of water provides little incentive 
to conserve. A user fee on water provides incentive to conserve. 
3. The State has limited dedicated funding sources to address active water management, 
adjudication, voluntary purchase of public water, or water conservation. The two income 
funds for water related planning and projects – Improvement of the Rio Grande Income 
Fund and Irrigation Works Construction Fund – are significantly depleted. A user fees 
would provide one recurring dedicated source of funding to fill this void. 
 
How Much Revenue Would a Water Conservation Charge Generate? 
The amount of revenue is wholly dependent on the amount of the user fee.  There are 
different alternatives policies makers may wish to consider. If we were to charge a minimal fee 
of $2.00 per acre-foot on the diversion of surface and groundwater statewide, it would generate 
about $6,900,000 annually, see Table 16.  
 
 
 
Table 16: Revenues Generated from a Diversion 
Charge  
  Surface Ground Total revenues 
Total 
diversions 
(aft)     2,106,663   1,341,702   
Charge 
per aft  $         2.00  $        2.00   
 
Revenues  $ 4,213,326 $2,683,404  $    6,896,730 
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This fee structure in Table 16 is simple and is uniformly applied to all water users. Alternatively, 
a fee structure that has a minimum impact on agriculture and low income domestic users but 
discourages the use of groundwater is presented in Table 17. 
 
--------------------------Surface--------------------------- -----------------Groundwater-------------------
Tax Rate Use Revenues Tax Rate Use Revenues
$ per acre foot Acre feet Collected $ per acre foot Acre feet Collected
Public $5.00                    38,191 $190,955 $10.00 282,469        $2,824,690
Domestic $0.35                            -   $0 $0.35 28,120          $9,842
Agriculture $2.00               1,921,786 $3,843,572 $2.00 921,726        $1,843,452
Livestock $2.00                      3,873 $7,746 $2.00 23,038          $46,076
Commercial $10.00                      2,138 $21,380 $10.00 18,367          $183,670
Industrial $10.00                      2,255 $22,550 $10.00 6,199            $61,990
Mining $10.00                         833 $8,330 $10.00 55,542          $555,420
Power $10.00                    51,912 $519,120 $10.00 6,241            $62,410
Evaporation -NA-                  521,432 -NA-
subtotals 2,542,420              4,613,653$     1,341,702     $5,587,550
Total Tax receipts
Surface Groundwater Total
$4,613,653 $5,587,550 $10,201,203
Water Use amount are base on
BRIAN, C. WILSON, P.E., 1997, "Water Use by Categories in New Mexico and River basins, 
and Irrigated Acreage in 1995", New Mexico State Engineer Office, Technical Report 49, Santa Fe, NM.
Table 17: Revenues from a Differentiated Water User Fee
 
 
Tom Turney, the ex State Engineer, has proposed a similar fee structure (Table 18) with higher 
fees on non-agricultural users. With the exception of agriculture and livestock which would be 
pay fees of $4 and $2 respectively and reservoir evaporation ($3), users would pay fees of $20 to 
$25. In addition, Turney recommends a fee applied to undeveloped Mendenhall declaration 
(claims to use groundwater in the future). This fees structure would generate $28 million in 
annual revenues.
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 Table 18:  Revenues from a Differentiated User Fee 
 Acre feet per year User Fee User Fee Revenue 
Category  (AFY) per afy per 1000 gallons Generated 
Commercial 
                            
25,169  $20.00 $0.061           503,380  
Domestic 
                            
35,150   $  20.00  $0.061           703,000  
Industrial 
                            
11,709       25.00  $0.077           292,725  
Irrigated 
Agriculture 
                       
3,223,954         4.00  $0.012       12,895,816  
Livestock 
                            
43,652         2.00  $0.006             87,304  
Mining 
                            
67,868       25.00  $0.077         1,696,700  
Power 
                            
63,157       25.00  $0.077         1,578,925  
Public water 
supply 
                          
331,793       20.00  $0.061         6,635,860  
Reservoir 
evaporation 
                          
431,437         3.00  $0.009         1,294,311  
      Subtotal 
                       
4,233,889     
     
Undeveloped 
Mendenhall 
                          
800,000         3.00           2,400,000  
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Declarations 
     
Total Revenue    $28,088,021.00 
 
What Is the Economic Impact of a Conservation Charge on Water Users? 
Water users would bear the brunt of a conservation charge but, in general, the economic 
impact to water users would be minimal.  Moreover, if the proceeds from the charge were used 
in part to offset the cost of implementing water conservation tools and better water management 
for water users, the benefits of the fee would directly accrue to the water user.   
Tables 18 and 19 below, itemize the impact to agriculture in the Rio Grande and Pecos 
Basin from the assessment of a water conservation charge.  Note that a conservation charge of 
$2.00 per acre-foot represents less than 2% of the total farm costs incurred by the farmer. 
Further, the reduction in net income (% of farm returns) resulting from the fees are less than 10% 
in all regions with the exception of Carlsbad in the Pecos Basin.  
  
Table 18: Impact of a Water Diversion Charge on Agriculture in Rio Grande Basin (2001) 
   $2.00 per aft for surface water and $2.00 per aft for groundwater 
         
Diversion tax as  
Northern 
Mountains Bernalillo Socorro Dona Ana 
   % of water delivery costs 29% 24% 33% 11% 
   % of cash operating costs 0.9% 2.7% 1.2% 0.6% 
   % of total farm costs 0.8% 1.6% 0.9% 0.5% 
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    % of farm returns 9.0% 7.9% NA 3.7% 
       
Table 19: Impact of a Water Diversion Charge on Agriculture in Pecos Basin (2001) 
   $2.00 per aft for surface water and $2.00 per aft for groundwater 
         
Diversion tax as  Carlsbad Artesia Roswell De Baca 
   % of water delivery costs 17% 8% 9% 16% 
   % of cash operating costs 1.4% 1.6% 3.2% 0.8% 
   % of total farm costs 1.0% 1.0% 1.7% 0.6% 
    % of farm returns 29.4% 5.4% 3.5% 4.4% 
 
 
For urban water users, the impact of a $20 diversion charge is shown on Table 20.  Note that a 
conservation charge of $20.00 per acre-foot would amount to less than 3% of the current unit  
costs. 
 
Table 20: Groundwater diversion tax as % of residential costs per 1000 gallons 
       
   Albuquerque Las Cruces Santa Fe 
  Current costs per 1000 gallons $ $ $2.15  2.21  4.50  
  Unit costs per 1 aft $ $ $700.47  720.02  1,466.10  
                                                 
7 Evaluation of the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District Irrigation System and Measurement Program, S.S. 
PAPADOPULOS & ASSOCIATES, INC. Boulder, Colorado, December 2002 
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  Diversion Charge per aft $ $ $20.00  20.00  20.00  
  % of current unit costs 2 2 1.36% .86% .78% 
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VII. State and Federal Government Should Act to Protect Rivers and Riparian Habitat 
 
The riparian or natural habitats (often called the Bosque) adjacent and in-stream to our 
river systems are in immediate and extreme peril.  It is not difficult to understand why this peril 
exists. The habitats use water. New Mexico no longer has low cost new supplies of water to 
satisfy existing uses and future growth. To obtain additional water, the easiest solution is to cut 
down the trees, destroy the habitat and channel the rivers. Currently there is no protection at all 
to prevent this from happening to the Bosque. Deforestation of the Bosque has already happen to 
a large degree. The Rio Grande south of Elephant Butte to the Texas border is almost completely 
devoid of original Bosque habitat. The Pecos is likewise completely devoid of trees except for 
stands of invasive salt cedar. We predict the Las Cruces picture will represent our entire state 
unless there is policy to stop this trend. There will be nothing natural about the rivers; they will 
be lined ditches devoid of trees - running the reach of the state.  We also predict that if we do 
deplete our rivers of all natural riparian habitats, New Mexico will decline economically. Our 
natural environment is one of our major selling points. We will have very little to sell if we give 
this up 
To protect the Bosque without harming other water users, the Bosque should be 
recognized as a beneficial use and diversion. The SEO should declare the Bosque a beneficial 
use in existence before human diversion and grant it a senior water right. The New Mexico 
legislature can assist in the process by clarifying that instream riparian water use is beneficial. 
Why would this not harm other water users? The Bosque in the middle Rio Grande currently 
exists and is consumptively using 136,000 aft of water. The trees by their location and root 
                                                 
8 Evaluation of the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District Irrigation System and Measurement Program, S.S. 
PAPADOPULOS & ASSOCIATES, INC. Boulder, Colorado, December 2002 
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structure simply take available water first thus nobody else can be using the water. Water users 
in Rio Grande are not harmed by the declaration of a water right.  
To restore the Bosque to a sustainable level of health would require more than just water. 
Invader species must be reduced and cottonwood trees re-established. Areas of undergrowth 
(basically a dumping area) should be cleared. Trails should be maintained. Forest management 
for fire protection should be actively engaged.  This could be best done if the Bosque were 
declared a state park and managed as such.    
With adjudication, additional water rights can be purchased for environmental restoration 
of other riparian areas. Because the water rights would be purchased, other water users would not 
be harmed by this action. 
The Rio Grande Silvery Minnow is an endangered species that requires protection by 
law. There are many myths about the species and contentious issues about its water use. What is 
really curious is that it will not take much water to maintain a permanent instream flow for the 
species. Water has to flow down the Rio Grande to Elephant Butte Reservoir to satisfy compact 
requirements. If the water required to sustain the fish were released during the entire year and not 
completely diverted (and only partially beneficial used as is the case now) the fish population 
could be restored to a non-endangered species without harming anyone. The consumptive water 
use of a year round release as opposed to current practices has been estimated at 20,000 to 
30,000 aft. This is only 4% of the 750,000 aft that must be delivered to the Texas side of the 
compact on a normal year. As noted in an early section, adjudication would improve diversion 
efficiency of irrigation districts.  Improved efficiency of MRGCD would keep an additional 
270,000 aft of water in the river, plenty enough for Silvery Minnow. 
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